Abstract-This paper studies node cooperation in a wireless network from the MAC layer perspective. A simple relay channel with a source, a relay, and a destination node is considered where the source can transmit a packet directly to the destination or transmit through the relay. The tradeoff between average energy and delay is studied by posing the problem as a stochastic dynamical optimization problem. The following two cases are considered: 1) nodes are cooperative and information is decentralized, and 2) nodes are strategic and information is centralized. With decentralized information and cooperative nodes, a structural result is proven that the optimal policy is the solution of a Bellmantype fixed-point equation over a time invariant state space. For specific cost functions reflecting transmission energy consumption and average delay, numerical results are presented showing that a policy found by solving this fixed-point equation outperforms conventionally used time-division multiple access (TDMA) and random access (RA) policies. When nodes are strategic and information is common knowledge, it is shown that cooperation can be induced by exchange of payments between the nodes, imposed by the network designer such that the socially optimal Markov policy corresponding to the centralized solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the resulting dynamic game.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N a wireless network, energy efficiency is an important criterion due to battery constraints. Traditionally in a network, nodes communicate directly to the base station. But the presence of other nodes in the network can lead to more energy efficient systems through node cooperation. This is because the presence of other nodes in the network can provide alternate routes with possibly less transmission energy costs. But this also increases the delay in the system as such cooperation requires successful transmission from the source to the relay node and then from relay node to the destination node. Thus there is a tradeoff between the energy cost for successfully routing a packet and the corresponding delay cost. The study of this tradeoff in the case of cooperative or strategic users with Manuscript received January 2, 2014; revised May 11, 2014 and August 4, 2014; accepted August 30, 2014 . Date of publication September 9, 2014; date of current version October 17, 2014 . This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation by Grant CIF-1111061. Part of this work was presented at the 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Monticello, IL, USA, October, 2012. The associate editor coordinating the review of this paper and approving it for publication was V. Wong.
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decentralized information can lead to interesting insights for the design of future cooperative communication systems. The relay channel is the simplest model and a building block for user cooperation in a network. It has been and is currently being studied extensively from the perspective of information theory (see for instance [1] - [3] and references therein) where theoretically achievable rates and practically implementable codes are investigated. Since information theory is an asymptotic theory, it does not capture directly the delay requirements which are important for many communication applications. In addition, information theoretic formulations cannot capture the dynamical aspect of a relay network which may be crucial when studying the behavior of higher layers in the network hierarchy. Finally, since in practice wireless devices are operated by humans, the selfish behavior needs to be taken into account for cooperation to be successful.
Recently game theory has been used as a tool to study strategic behavior of nodes participating in a communication network (see [4] - [13] and references therein). The work in [11] studies a source-relay channel with non-cooperative nodes in non-fading and fading channel as finite and infinite repeated games, respectively. The works in [4] , [5] propose schemes for multi hop routing based on reputation system to punish noncooperative nodes in wireless ad hoc networks. Evolutionary game theory is used in [13] to punish selfish nodes that do not cooperate to forward packets. The works in [6] , [7] , [9] , [12] adopt pricing mechanisms in wireless ad hoc networks to foster cooperation among non-cooperative nodes. Two auction mechanisms for a relay network are proposed in [12] (SNR auction and power auction) that determine relay selection and relay power allocation in a distributed fashion. The research reported in [9] introduces a "bribery" mechanism that fosters cooperation using a microeconomic framework based on game theory that encourages forwarding among selfish nodes by reimbursing forwarding. Finally, [8] proposes a distributed and scalable acceptance algorithm for nodes to decide whether to accept or reject a relay request. Their algorithm results in a Nash equilibrium and is proven that the system converges to the rational and optimal operating point.
Most of the works [6] - [9] , [11] - [13] assume that sources always have data to send and thus do not consider random traffic arrival processes at a node as may be the case in a network. Others [8] , [11] , [13] model the communication as repeated games (for example iterative prisoner's dilemma where Tit-forTat strategy induces cooperative behavior) whereas [6] , [7] , [9] , [12] use prices to incentivize nodes to cooperate. This paper considers independent random arrival processes at the source and the relay node which results in a dynamic system (either a dynamic team for cooperative nodes, or a dynamic game [14] for strategic users).
In this paper the MAC layer of the relay channel is studied as a stochastic control problem of optimally routing packets to the destination. The model assumes a half duplex relay channel with a source, a relay and a destination node with incoming traffic at both the source and the relay node. Also it assumes generic cost functions at time t reflecting packet delay (through the backlog in each agent's queue) and transmission energy. Among other possible formulations, stochastic control of a relay channel can be studied as a static or a dynamic optimization problem, or when information (such as queue backlog) is centralized or decentralized, or when users are non-strategic (cooperative) or strategic, or with complete or incomplete information (of utilities and system parameters). This paper focuses on complete-information of utilities and system parameters and studies two cases:
(a) dynamic, non-strategic (cooperative) players with decentralized information (Section III), (b) dynamic, strategic players with centralized information (Section IV).
In Section III the relay channel is studied in the case of cooperative users. The case where information such as the backlog of each user is known to everybody (the centralized problem) is well known and can be formulated and solved as a standard Markov Decision Process (MDP) problem. The case is more interesting when information about agents' backlogs is not available to everyone. This problem is studied in Section III-B and is formulated as a decentralized dynamic team problem where users cooperate to minimize expected energy and average delay of the entire network. The key feature of the model is the non-classical information structure, that is, the source and the relay nodes do not observe each other's queue lengths, but through feedback, learn each other's previous actions. Since there is no single controller, rather both source and relay nodes are controllers with linked stochastic control problems, this setup does not fit into the standard framework of MDP theory [15] , [16] . Similar decentralized control problems were studied in [17] - [19] . Utilizing an approach similar to [19] of viewing the decentralized system from the point of view of a fictitious coordinator, a structural result is proven which shows that there exists an optimal policy that is the solution of a Bellman-type fixed point equation where the optimization is done over a fixed state space as opposed to an ever-increasing state-space in general. The contribution in this part is to show that the optimal decentralized control strategies are based on the pair of marginal distributions of the queue lengths that the source and relay agents are storing and updating in real time. Inspired by the optimal solution found above, suboptimal decentralized strategies are investigated and their performance is compared (using numerical analysis and simulation) to standard transmission strategies such as time-division multiple access (TDMA) and other random access (RA) protocols.
In Section IV this communication setup is studied with the assumption that users are strategic in nature and the following question is asked: can the socially optimal policy (obtained by a centralized controller) be implemented by strategic users.
Relay channel was also studied for strategic users in [20] where authors pose the problem as a static game and cooperation is induced using a reward mechanism and strategies are analyzed in Nash equilibrium. The present work takes into account the dynamic aspect of the problem and poses it as a sequential game of complete information and simultaneous moves [14] . The starting point here is the observation that when users are strategic, there are more than one equilibria that may not coincide with the socially optimum solution. The contribution in this part is to show (through an explicit construction) that the network designer can impose payments to be exchanged between source and relay nodes, such that the resulting dynamic game has the social optimal policy as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
The two parts of the paper broadly address the issue of stochastic control of the relay channel and have a dynamic flavor due to the random incoming traffic model. This induces the solution concept for both cases to be within the sequential framework: dynamic programming for the former and subgame perfect equilibrium for the latter.
Throughout this paper, a random variable is denoted by an upper case letter and its realization by the corresponding lower case letter. Subscripts denote time indices, such that X a:b is a short hand for the vector (X a , X a+1 , . . . , X b ), if a > b, then X a:b is empty. Superscripts denote agents such that U i t , is a quantity relevant to agent i. We also use the notation
for the vector of quantities relating to both agents. P(A) denotes the probability of an event A, E(X) denotes the expectation of random variable X, R represents the set of real numbers and N represents the set {1, 2, . . . N}.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the model. In Section III, the team problem is studied when users are cooperative and minimize a common cost criterion. The centralized and decentralized problems are posed and structural results are given for the decentralized problem in Section III-B. In Section III-C, numerical results are presented comparing the performance of a suboptimal decentralized policy with TDMA and RA. In Section IV, the case when users are strategic is discussed. Section V presents the conclusion. A number of proofs are delegated to the Appendices.
II. MODEL
The model of the system studied in this paper, as shown in Fig. 1 , consists of a source node (node 1), a relay node (node 2) and a destination node (node 3). The time is discretized into slots and Bernoulli 1 packet arrival processes {P i t } ∞ t=1 , i = 1, 2 are assumed at node i, with the probability of arrival of a packet in any slot being p i ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2. This model can be considered as a prototype for a larger network, where each source node can also act as a relay for other source nodes, thereby potentially minimizing total cost in the network. This view justifies the above assumption of independent arrival processes. Both nodes 1 and 2 have queues of size N . The number of packets at time t in the queue of node i is denoted by x i t , i = 1, 2. The source has to send the packets in its queue to the destination and it has a choice to either transmit them directly to the destination or transmit them through the relay or not transmit at all. At time t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, node i, i = 1, 2 takes action u i t , as a function of all the information gathered till time t. In subsequent sections we will study different scenarios with different available information to the agents at time t. The possible actions for node 1 are wait (W ), transmit to node 2 (T 12 ) and transmit to node 3 (T 13 ); and possible actions for node 2 are wait (W ) and transmit to node 3 (T 23 ), thus having
It is assumed that simultaneous transmissions from both node 1 and node 2 lead to unsuccessful reception (collision) at the receiver. It is further assumed that even at the event of a collision the packet headers can be decoded at node 3 2 . Under these assumptions, the system evolution can be described by the following set of equations, where the queue length of a node at time t is given by the minimum of (a) its queue size N and (b) its queue length at time t − 1 plus 1 if there was an arrival in time slot t, minus 1 if a packet was successfully transmitted in t − 1 slot
for t ∈ {2, 3, . . .}, where 1 A (·) is the indicator function of the set A. At the end of time slot t, nodes 1 and 2 receive noiseless feedback w t ∈ {0, 1, 2, e 1 , e 2 } from the destination node stating if the destination node successfully received the transmission from node 1 (w t = 1); if the destination node successfully received the transmission from node 2 (w t = 2); if the destination node didn't receive any transmission destined to it (w t = 0); if there was a collision with two packets destined to it (w t = e 1 ); or, finally, if there was a collision at node 3 due to a simultaneous transmission from node 1 to 2 and node 2 to 3 (w t = e 2 ). Thus each node i = 1, 2 at time t can determine
) from the feedback w t and it own action u i t . This implies that part of the system information (in this case the agents' actions) is shared between the agents with unit delay, while information about the queue lengths is not shared (please refer to [19] for a general discussion on delay-shared patterns). Throughout this paper, it is also assumed that all controllers have perfect recall.
Generic instantaneous cost functions g i t (x t , u t ) are defined for node i = 1, 2 as functions of queue lengths x t = (x 1 t , x 2 t ) and actions u t of both the nodes. To quantify the energydelay tradeoff the following costs are assumed. The energy cost of transmissions are defined by functions e 1 :
, E 23 } such that energy cost for transmission from node 1 to node 3, e 1 (T 13 ) = E 13 , node 1 to node 2 is e 1 (T 12 ) = E 12 and that for node 2 to node 3 is e 2 (T 23 ) = E 23 . The energy cost for waiting is 0 i.e., e 1 (W ) = e 2 (W ) = 0. The instantaneous delay cost at time t for node i = 1, 2 is assumed to be equal to the total number of packets waiting in the queue of node i plus cost c d for each dropped packet. One instance of such cost function that captures both energy and average delay is g
represent the events that the next arrived packet is dropped for node 1 and 2 respectively,
All costs are additive and costs for future slots (or epochs) are discounted by a discount factor λ, (0 < λ < 1). The tuple
summarizes the basic parameters of the system.
III. COOPERATIVE USERS
In this section the team problem is studied where both nodes act cooperatively i.e., have the same objective. In particular, in Section III-A the centralized problem is defined where there is a single controller observing all relevant information and has perfect recall. The solution of this problem is not studied in this paper, since it is well-known and can be found as the solution of a dynamic program, either analytically or numerically. The result is briefly stated for completeness and since it is going to serve as the baseline solution with which all other solutions will be compared. In Section III-B the decentralized problem is discussed where there are two controllers with different information sets, though with perfect recall. In this case, the nodes cannot observe each other's queues. Their own queue history is their private information and feedback history is the common information. Decentralized problems with nonclassical information structure are notoriously hard [21] . One of the contributions of this work is to show that the optimum strategy can be found as solution of a dynamic program over a large but time-invariant state space. Finally, numerical results are presented in Section III-C that compare the performance of a suboptimal decentralized policy (inspired by the optimal one found in Section III-B) with TDMA and RA policies.
A. Centralized Control Problem
At time t, the common knowledge of nodes 1 and 2 (or centralized controller) is u 1:t−1 , x 1:t . Thus the control action at time t, u t ∈ U 1 × U 2 , can (in general) be a function of all the information available till that time
A given policy ψ = (ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ψ 3 , . . .) induces a total discounted cost over the horizon T equal to
The centralized problem is defined as follows Problem 1: Find the centralized policy ψ * that achieves the optimum cost,
with J ψ defined in (4), system update equation given by (2) and control actions u t as in (3) . The solution of this problem is well-known and hinges on the following fact.
Fact 1: The process {(X t , U t ); t = 0, 1, . . .} is a controlled Markov process with state X t , control U t , and instantaneous cost g
Proof: This is trivially true due to the system evolution given in (2), the independence of the basic random variables
. .) and the instantaneous cost being a function of only the current state and action (X t , U t ).
Thus by the theory of MDPs [15] , [16] , there exists a Markov policy of the form u t = (u
. Moreover this optimal cost can be found using dynamic programming. The reader is kindly referred to the authors' report [22] for more details about this centralized problem and its solution.
B. Decentralized Control Problem
In this section, a more practical case is considered whereby users cannot observe each other's queues. This is an instance of decentralized information as the information sets of the two nodes are not the same.
At time t, information available to node k is (x 
In the remaining of this section, the infinite horizon problem is considered for expositional simplicity (the proposed solution also applies to the finite-horizon case). The instantaneous cost functions are assumed time invariant, i.e., g
is the combined strategy of both the nodes and the corresponding discounted cost J φ is given by
The decentralized control problem can now be stated as Problem 2: Find the optimal decentralized policy φ * that achieves the optimal Cost
with J φ defined in (8) , system update equation given by (2), and control actions u t as in (7).
The controls actions, as given in (7), are functions of an ever increasing space. In this section, we seek to simplify the domain of these functions to a succinct, fixed space. To that effect, a structural result is proved for the optimal decentralized policy and shown that it can be found as a solution of a Bellman-type fixed-point equation. It is first proven that there exist optimal control actions of a node that depend only on its current queue length and the entire control history of both the nodes i.e., (x k t , u 1:t−1 ). In the second simplification step, it is shown that there exists an optimal policy that depends on the current queue length x k t and the posterior on x t conditioned on the control history u 1:t−1 . In the final simplification step it is shown that the aforementioned posterior distribution on x t can be substituted by the pair of marginal distributions over x k t for k = 1, 2. In this decentralized case, at time t, x k 1:t is the private information of node k and u 1:t−1 is the common information available to both nodes. The following lemma proves that given the common information, the private information of the two nodes is independent.
Lemma 1: For any fixed strategy φ, random variables X 
Thus,
We now proceed to show that each node can summarize its private information to only the current queue state without loss of optimality. For this the following lemma is required.
Lemma 2: For any given fixed strategy φ 2 of node 2, the pro-
Proof: See Appendix A As a consequence of the MDP structure of the problem (given a fixed strategy φ 2 of node 2), the optimal policy by node 1 can be a Markov policy [16] . Since this is true for any fixed strategy of node 2, it is also true for the optimal strategy of the node 2. A similar result can be obtained by interchanging the roles of node 1 and 2, thus the optimal decentralized policy can be of the form below without loss of optimality
Even with the above simplification, Problem 2 reduces to two linked stochastic control problems for which a solution is not readily available. We proceed to the second simplification step by reexamining this problem from the perspective of a fictitious coordinator [19] who observes, at time t, the feedback w t or equivalently u t−1 (common information) but does not observe x k t , k ∈ {1, 2} (private information). This fictitious coordinator (which can be replicated at both nodes) generates partial functions γ t = γ 1:2 t = (γ 
Based upon these coordinator control outputs, node k, k ∈ {1, 2} computes its action by operating these partial functions on its private information x k t , as shown in Fig. 2 . In particular, denoting the coordinator strategy at time and node k action will be given by
In the following we show that the coordinator strategy can be simplified by summarizing the history of the common information into a sufficient statistic with time-invariant domain.
In particular we show that belief on x t given the observation history u 1:t−1 and control history γ 1:t−1 till time t, forms a sufficient state for the coordinator's problem. We define the random variable Π t ∈ P(N 2 ) as the posterior pmf of X t conditioned on U 1:t , Γ 1:t−1 i.e.,
The next lemma shows that this quantity can be recursively updated by the coordinator in a deterministic fashion. Lemma 3: There exists a deterministic update function F , independent of the coordinator's policy Ψ, that updates the state π t given control γ t and variable u t .
Proof: See Appendix B The following proposition establishes that the coordinator's problem is an MDP.
Proposition 1: The process {(Π t , Γ t ); t = 1, 2, . . .} is a controlled Markov process with state Π t and control Γ t , i.e.,
Proof: See Appendix C Since {(Π t , Γ t ); t = 1, 2, . . .} is a controlled Markov process the optimal output functions can be given by Markov policies [16] (γ Furthermore, the optimal actions for the coordinator are the solutions of the fixed-point equation
where the expectation is with respect to the conditional probability induced by the update function F and u t as random variable (noise), in accordance with [19] . Finally, in the remaining of this section we proceed with the last simplification step and show that, due to the specific nature of our problem, instead of the joint probability Π t on the queue length of the two nodes, individual marginals form a sufficient state. To that effect, we define the random variable Ξ k t ∈ P(N ) as the posterior pmf of X k t conditioned on U 1:t−1 , Γ 1:t−1 i.e., (24) and show that {(Ξ t , Γ t ); t = 1, 2, . . .} is controlled Markov process (where
). This gives a significant reduction in the size of the state space over which the optimal policies are defined, since π is defined over a space of P(N 2 ) while ξ is defined over P(N ) × P(N ). For finite queue length of size N , P(N 2 ) grows super exponentially in N as R 
Proof: See Appendix D Proposition 2: The process {(Ξ t , Γ t ); t = 1, 2, . . .} is a controlled Markov process with state Ξ t and controls Γ t , i.e.,
Proof: See Appendix E Since {(Ξ t , Γ t ); t = 1, 2, . . .} is a controlled Markov process, the optimal output functions can be given by Markov policies γ t = ψ t (ξ t ), and can be derived as solutions of the fixed-point equation
where the expectation is with respect to the conditional probability induced by the update functions (G 1 , G 2 ) and u t as random variable (noise). In summary, the optimal control actions are of the form
and in the on-line operation of the system are generated as follows: at time t, each node (source and relay) first updates the quantities ξ t−1 as dictated by the recursion (25) and based upon ξ t they find the corresponding action γ t as dictated by the (offline) solution of (28 (28) does not follow.
C. Numerical Results
In this section, we compare the performance of a suboptimal decentralized policy obtained from our analysis in the previous section, with standard TDMA and RA policies (which themselves are decentralized policies). We assume the cost function of the form g(x t , u t ) = x
Regarding the decentralized policy, we chose to solve the fixed-point equation (23) instead of the simpler one in (28) . Although (28) is an important theoretic simplification of the state space, the reason for this choice is that equation (23) resembles a Bellman-type fixed-point equation for a partially observed MDP (POMDP) and thus can be solved using standard POMDP solvers if the underlying state and action space is finite. However, although equation (28) has significantly smaller space of optimization, it cannot be solved using standard POMDP solvers as it does not have the linear structure required by standard POMDP solvers.
For a finite maximum queue length N , there are
We expect that the optimum γ 1:2, * functions to be of "threshold-type" [23] , [24] , i.e., the domain {0, 1, . . . , N} of each γ i to be partitioned into contiguous regions, one corresponding to each action in U i . The threshold nature of policies is proved for queueing and other problems in [23] , [25] and generally requires proving properties like concavity, supermodularity, superconcavity etc. of the cost-togo function. It is usually hard to show that some set of properties of the cost-to-go function propagate through the dynamic programming equation, more so for POMDPs where state space is a connected simplex. We do not prove the optimality of threshold policies but find a suboptimal decentralized policy by solving (23) over threshold policies defined as all possible policies of the following form parametrized by (α, β, θ). We call this policy ψ * .
For the numerical analysis, we choose N = 2, which is a compromise between accuracy of results and complexity of solving the fixed-point equation. For a given policy which results in a system where queues are expected to get empty frequently (i.e., (0,0) is expected to be a recurrent state), the stationary distribution of the system is expected to have significant weight around the queue sizes (0,0) and negligible weight for larger queue lengths. Thus such a small value for N is a justified approximation for lightly loaded systems. We numerically solve equation (23) Both TDMA and RA policies prescribe allocation of slots to users. In each allocated slot, a user chooses the optimal action that minimizes the cost to go. For example when the slot is allocated to the source, it takes one of the following actions {W, T 12 , T 13 } that is optimal for the current state. The numerical results are obtained by numerically analyzing the steady state distribution of the Markov process induced by implementing the optimal policy which is found by enumerating all threshold policies. The TDMA policy assumes that users access the channel as dictated by a commonly observed binary random variable, the distribution of which is optimized for each pair of (p 1 , p 2 ). As a result the channel is not allocated equally to source and relay, but optimally as dictated by their traffic loads. The RA policy assumes that users access the channel as dictated by private random back-off times whose distribution is geometric and optimized for their traffic loads. The corresponding results are obtained by numerically analyzing the steady state distribution of the induced Markov process. In both TDMA and RA, when a slot is available to a node, that node plays its optimal action. Thus for e.g. in TDMA, relaying is achieved as follows: when node 1 is given a slot, node 1 sends a packet to node 2, and when node 2 is given a slot, node 2 it sends its packet to the receiver. Finally, the solution of the centralized problem mentioned in Section III-A is shown, which serves as a lower bound for all decentralized policies.
We make the following observations regarding the results shown in Fig. 3 . The decentralized policy ψ * outperforms both RA and TDMA policies for all given p 1 , p 2 . To take an instance, for p 1 = 0.1, p 2 = 0.1, the costs obtained for policies ψ * , RA, TDMA and optimum centralized are 0.4230, 0.6241, 0.5307, 0.3845, respectively.
IV. STRATEGIC USERS
This section considers the case when users are strategic i.e., when they have potentially different cost criteria and are selfish. For problems with multiple agents having their individual objective functions, equilibrium is an acceptable solution concept [14] , where equilibrium is loosely defined as set of policies for each agent such that no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its policy.
With strategic nodes in our previous model, both nodes have linked stochastic processes such that their actions affect each other's current and future costs, so they determine their actions in order to minimize their own average total cost over the given time horizon. In this section we consider a centralized information model where all system variables are perfectly observed by both agents (as was the case in Section III-A).
It is also assumed that cost functions and system parameters are common knowledge. In this case, the system evolves as a dynamic game of perfect information and simultaneous moves [14] . In such a case, the relay node may not want to accept packets from the source node as that will result in larger delay (longer backlog for his own queue) as well as extra transmission energy. Thus, the socially optimal solution may not be implementable in an equilibrium concept. One possible way to induce relay cooperation is for the source to pay the relay node for relaying the packet (and similarly, for the relay to pay the source for backing off from transmission so that it can transmit his own packets). This entails the question of whether, through such payments, an equilibrium solution would lead to the socially optimum solution.
The main result in this section is that there exist payment transfers to be imposed by the network designer such that the optimum Markov policy of the centralized problem (as discussed in Section III-A) is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game.
The model for the dynamic game with finite horizon T is now formalized. When nodes are strategic, it is intuitive to think that relay node would not want to accept source's packets since that increases it's queue length. Thus the strategic users may never achieve socially optimal cost when (T 12 , W ) is an optimum action. To capture this behavior of node 2, we enhance its available actions as
where possible actions for node 2 are wait while accepting the packet from node 1 (W a ), wait while rejecting the packet (W r ) or transmit to node 3 (T 23 ). The queue length of a node at time t is given by the minimum of (a) its queue size N and (b) its queue length at time t − 1 plus 1 if there was an arrival in time slot t, minus 1 if a packet was successfully transmitted in t − 1 slot, i.e.,
with the meaning of these variables being exactly the same as in (2) . Let H denote the set of all histories which are all possible sequences of actions taken by the nodes and nature (arrival processes p t = (p (33) where state sequences have also been added to the histories since they can be determined through (32) by the action and arrival histories. With N = 2 users, set of histories H, generic instantaneous cost functions g i t (x t , u t ), i = 1, 2, and simultaneous actions taken at each time t based on the history h t , a dynamic game of perfect information with simultaneous moves is defined [14] , [26] , henceforth referred to as G. The goal is to design a payment exchange mechanism 3 such that the optimal solution of the centralized problem discussed in Section III-A is achieved as subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game. To that effect functions C t : H × U 1 × U 2 → R are defined as the payment made 4 by node 1 to node 2 at time t. With these payment exchanges, let the new game,G be defined as before with instantaneous cost functionŝ
for node 1 and 2 respectively. Note that although the payment functions are history dependent and thus their domain is timevaryting, it will be shown that due to the structure of this problem, they need only be state dependent.
It is easy to see that with so many degrees of freedom, a game can be constructed such that socially optimum solution is a (not necessarily unique) subgame perfect equilibrium of the game as shown by the following construction. Indeed, for α ∈ (0, 1), let payments be designed as
Then the instantaneous costs of user 1 and 2 arê
In this case, the objectives of both users are aligned with the social objective and the socially optimal solution is also a Nash Equilibrium. The problem with this construction is that, in general, there may exist additional Nash equilibria that may not achieve socially optimal solution. In the remaining part of this section, a new construction of payment function is provided and sufficient conditions are found for the socially optimal strategy to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of gameG. In the following lemma, payments are constructed for a static game, and later this idea is extended to dynamic games.
Lemma 5: Consider a strategic game of two players with finite action sets (
(not necessarilly an equillibrium). There exists a payment function C : , b) is the unique strictly dominant strategy equilibrium of the new strategic game with the updated costs.
Proof: For (a, b) to be the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium, the following conditions need to be satisfied
Let
and for u 1 = a, u 2 = b, are equivalent to
Since action sets are finite, there exists payments C(u 1 , u 2 ) with C(u 1 , b) large enough and C(a, u 2 ) small enough such that inequalities (38) and (39) are satisfied.
The above lemma shows that the cost variables {C(
need to satisfy linear inequalities (38) and (39) i.e., can be chosen from a polytope which is always non-empty. A feasible solution can be found by first applying a vertex enumeration algorithm [34] which finds the vertices, rays and linearities of the polytope described by the linear inequalities (38) and (39) and then an arbitrary point is selected as the sum of a convex combination of the vertices, a conic combination of the rays and a linear combination of the linearities.
Note that the above lemma provides a very strong type of equilibrium design, i.e., strictly dominant strategy equilibrium. Also, the above construction of the game allows for negative payments by either user. Even though negative payments are commonly used to induce users to behave in a way desired by the designer (see for e.g., [28] , [29] , [32] , [33] , [35] ), the above construction can be proved with positive payments only. 5 This idea is now extended to dynamic games in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Fix a Markov policy ψ * = (ψ * t )
T t=1 for the original centralized stochastic control problem (not necessarily the optimal one). Consider the dynamic game G defined above. There exists payments C t : N × N × U 1 × U 2 → R which are exchanged between nodes 1 and 2 at each time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . T − 1} such that ψ * is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the resulting dynamic gameG.
Proof: For gameG at any time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . T }, after history h ∈ H and action profile u ∈ U 1 × U 2 , the cost-to-go functions for both nodes are
where
are queue lengths of user 1 and 2 corresponding to history h. 5 Due to the finiteness of the action sets, there always exists a c > 0 such that 
2 ) be constructed as in Lemma 5 for the game with instantaneous costs being the cost-to-go functions g
for each user i, such that action profile σ(h) is the strictly dominant strategy equilibrium. Then,
The above implies that for each subgameG(h), the policy σ| h strictly dominates every other policy σ inG(h) that differs from σ| h only in the action it prescribes after the initial history ofG(h The above result gives a constructive proof of existence of payment transfers such that any Markov policy can be implemented; and thus the socially optimum Markov policy can also be implemented as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game. Although this result was established for a finite horizon T , it can be extended to infinite horizon with discounted costs. Tables I and II is chosen for demonstrating the resulting cost-to-go functions and payments. Tables I(a) and II(a) give the cost-to-go functions V 1,σ t (x t ) for the game at time t obtained using policy iteration such that the socially optimal Markov policy (for the centralized problem) is implemented (i.e., is the dominant strategy) for all times after t. Due to the time-invariance of costs, policy iteration converges to a stationary solution, which, for this set of parameters is the policy (W, T 23 ) when at the chosen state (x In this game, the total expected cost for a user by participating in the game should be less than the expected cost they incur by not participating in the game. It is assumed that by non-participation, the users are not able to transmit their packets and thus their queues increase to capacity, whereas by participating in the game they do strictly better. Thus for reasonable cost functions (for e.g. g i (x, u) ∼ x i ) which are monotonously increasing and unbounded with the queue length, and for large enough N and λ close to 1, the users will always have an incentive to participate in the game.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper studies energy and delay tradeoff in cooperative communication through a simple relay channel, when the source and the destination node are cooperative and when they are strategic. When users are cooperative, by posing it as a decentralized, infinite horizon decentralized stochastic control problem, a structural result is proven stating that the optimal policy can be found by solving a Bellman-type fixedpoint equation and optimal control can be given as u
The domain of optimization is the space of the pair of marginal probability mass functions on the integers P(N ) × P(N ). Numerical results are presented to compare the performance of a suboptimal policy from our analysis with standard TDMA and RA policies. Future research directions include the unveiling of additional structural properties of the optimal strategy (e.g., threshold strategies), as well as designing optimal and efficient suboptimal strategies. This problem can be extended to the case of multiple source/relay nodes. For this, the model needs to be enriched so that each collision also contains the information regarding which nodes transmitted. This can be achieved if each node transmits a "signature" waveform along with the data waveform such that the signature waveforms of all users are mutually orthogonal and orthogonal to the data (e.g., in frequency). The optimal decentralized solution scales exponentially with the number of nodes i, since, as shown in this work, a sufficient state for control is the set of marginal distributions {ξ The second part of this paper studies the relay channel with strategic source and relay nodes that minimize their individual expected energy and average delay. It is shown that there exist transfer payment functions C t (·, ·) such that implementing socially optimal Markov policy is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game. In this work an important assumption is made that all information including states and utility functions are known to everybody. The decentralized setup for strategic users i.e., when states are not known, would be a challenging and interesting problem to consider and to the best knowledge of the authors, dynamic games with decentralized information are not well studied [36] , [37] . If the assumption of known utilities is relaxed, then the problem becomes significantly harder and comes under the purview of mechanism design and Implementation Theory for dynamic games [38] , [39] . 
where first part in numerator in (46c) is true since given policy ψ, γ t can be computed as γ t = ψ t (u 1:t−1 ).
We conclude that P (x t |u 1:t , γ 1:t ) = π t (x t )1 {γ t (x t )} (u t )
thus,
where F is independent of policy ψ.
APPENDIX C Proof:
P (π t+1 |π 1 
